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The Greek Crisis

By now, it seems like the entire world knows something about the “Greek Crisis.” Yet, few people understand the real causes that underlie this tsunami that has swept away the assumptions of generations of Greeks. Even fewer are clear about what has to be done to restore Greece to growth and prosperity.

Professors Odysseus Katsaitis, Dimitris Doulos and Nicholas Prirounakis of the DEREE Economics Department, wrote a three-part treatise on the origins of the crisis, the current developments, and the way forward, respectively, in order to give readers an overview of the most dramatic developments to be faced by post-World War II Greece.

Also, Dr. Nickolaos Travlos, dean of the ALBA Graduate Business School at The American College of Greece, writes about private higher education – once one of the mightiest taboos in Greek politics – can actually prove an economic boon for the country.

Finally, London criminologist, Dr. Leonidas K. Cheliotis, a DEREE alumnus, writes about the not-so-obvious correlation between crisis and crime rates.

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Food for Thought From Business Week 2012

DEREE Business Week 2012, a four-day business-oriented conference organized by students of the DEREE School of Business in cooperation with their faculty, acquired additional poignancy this year, when its opening speaker, Greek enterprises union president, Dimitris Daskalopoulos, ventured to say that Greek society suffers from a deep-seated and short-sighted ideological deformation that amounts to “left wing conservatism.” Daskalopoulos said that this is one of the main causes of the current crisis, since it has consistently stifled reform and entrepreneurship in the country (see Daskalopoulos’s full address [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4nNCw1WiJA&context=C4168f3fADvjVQa1PpcFMkn1sb-1awTS4vOlMu4G9CJoy2dMA_dLg= ] in English).

Four days later brand strategist Peter Economides, closed the conference in front of a standing-room-only audience of students with a stirring oresentation about the need for learning in an interconnected world. Economides said that Greece has to learn its way out of the current, severe financial crisis. (see Economides’s full presentation in English [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m66R1Guncw4&context=C4e14a97ADvjVQa1PpcFMkn1sb-1awTYWdcOzwLhTGKjoE6xrOlFo=]).

Throughout the week a series of high profile speakers discussed the week’s topic, “The Learning Organization: A Key to Competitiveness?” They included Aegean Airlines CEO Dimitris Gerogiannis, TNT Greece CEO Christina Alevizou, Costa Navarino General Manager hotelier Peter Alatsas, venture capitalist Onic Palandjian, journalists Babis Papademetriou and Antonis Papagiannides.

Dozens of DEREE Business School students worked hard to bring off Business Week. In fact, Business Week stands out as a learning experience that teaches students the exhilarating results of cooperation and teamwork. They were assisted and advised by faculty members who brought to the table years of experience with similar events and ensured that the choice of speakers served the core theme of this year’s event.

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Mike Koumartzakis: It’s My Job to Be Optimistic

What did you study at DEREE?

I decided to study at Deree when I was 17. I don’t really remember why I chose Deree instead of the economics department of the law school where I was also accepted. The truth is that at that time I didn’t have many factors to influence me. My decision was probably based on the simple fact that Greek university started with a two-month delay because of strikes, and the much more appealing Deree facilities.

How did it help you in your life so far?

I almost all ways it has been a very influential experience. As a personality, it gave me the chance to become more organized, fast thinking and alert. In the professional field it gave me from day one a better understanding of how a multinational environment feels like and also the chance to meet great people (fellow students, professors, staff). As a businessman, today I continuously recall words and actions from classes and basketball training sessions at Deree.

Which was your favorite course?

I cannot exclude many courses. However, I was always attracted to courses that were closely related to real market action; that were marketing and sales related. I remember I enjoyed my last marketing course most – although I do not recall its title…

Your favorite professor?

Many! Nikos Koumettis and Sotiris Kyriakos for being so inspiring as to the reality of the workplace. He doesn’t know it but I chose my first company because Koumetis was working there. He was certainly the best for me. Also Professors Gounaris , Burke and Valahas. I still use the presentation rules of the last two.

Your favorite activity at the College?

Playing for the Deree basketball team; great experience and some great sweating moments there with coach Papahatzis pushing us to the limit.

Your favorite spot on campus?

The gym, [the then] Wendy’s and the pool. Also Room 330 – a great classroom for presentations – that has now been converted to office space.

Did you make any close friends at DEREE?

So many I cannot make any exceptions by mentioning anyone. Except Chris Koukios, who is also my best man.

How did your come up with the idea for your business?

Ever since I can remember myself I was talking about ventures. All sorts of ventures – online ties to whatever one can think of. I was an MBA student at Bocconi when I did this research for online travel in Greece. While presenting, a professor started asking questions and pushing me. At the end he said “If it is so good, why don’t you proceed?” And here I am…

As you went about setting up figame.gr, did any lesson learned at DEREE stay in your mind?

What I, and the whole team of Figame.gr LTD, do is very closely related to marketing. I remember Koumettis talking about bringing results in any possible way. He was talking about innovation in all the ways you are operating. All these marketing courses are being applied in our company now. We innovate everyday: new processes, new applications and new ways of operating.

Entrepreneurship is not valued in Greece as it is in other countries. Where did you find the drive to become an entrepreneur?

The truth is that in other countries you have the option to fail as an entrepreneur and it’s OK. In Greece, if you fail, you might end up in jail without having done anything illegal. The drive can come only from you. No one can inspire you or show you the way when starting something new. And there are moments that it hurts a lot. So now, when younger people me ask me if they should start a new business, after examining all the pros and cons and giving some directions I tell them not to do it. I do that because if my opinion is to affect their choice they are not ready to do it. If it won’t, they will do it anyway.

Did you anticipate this kind of crisis when you were starting?

There are different definitions of crisis. In Greece we have been talking about crisis for the last 20 years. So if the question refers to whether I was expecting 20% unemployment, a currency-change threat, massive income reductions and a dry-out in bank lending to companies, then I certainly did not.

Would you have started figame.gr had you known how severe the crisis would be?

Yes, but not in Greece. As a professional and as a businessman I never accept reasons like “crisis” for continuing to run companies in any environment. It is always in our hands to change sector, market or anything else necessary in order to make the company viable at the very least.

Greece is notorious for its bureaucracy. How has that affected you and your business?

It is very difficult at the beginning, when you open the company and start operating it. It is a real nightmare. Also it creates many problems in effecting radical change in companies. But after a point things happen more smoothly. From time to time you always remember the bureaucracy though. Problems are also very much related to high taxation.

What special adjustments have you made so that your company can survive the crisis?

We are in a constant adjustments process. We decrease operating costs and at the same time invest in new travel software products that we are building. We know that crisis is here to stay. So we expand in niche travelling markets having to do with corporate travel, congress travel and also better solutions for the Greek traveler.

Tell us a few things that you would change in order to make life easier for entrepreneurs.

The speed that things can be done must change. We should be able to open and close companies very fast, to open accounts in foreign countries, to move capital and resources. We have to become business-friendlier in all aspects. Entrepreneurs and companies must deal with the core of their business and not spend time with irrelevant legal and other bureaucratic matters. In short: cut bureaucracy in all parts of the economy.

Tell us a positive and a negative lesson you learned from running your companies.

I cannot find negative lessons. I can only think of negative things that happened and gave me the experience not to do them again. So all the lessons are positive. Some of those I can think of: no matter how pressed you are, keep thinking where you want to be in a year from now and take steps towards that; don’t shortchange the future by spending all your time trying to solve current problems. After all, the future is all you have! The past is already gone and the present will expire very-very soon.

Have fellow alumni supported your venture?

No.

Are you optimistic for the future?

It’s my job to be optimistic. I lead people and a company. If you cannot formulate the future so that you are optimistic, there is something you are doing wrong. So keep restructuring, rethinking, reshaping and everything will be turned around.

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Marilena Emmanouil: We Thrive Because of the Crisis

What did you study at DEREE?

I studied Marketing Management.

How did it help you in your life so far?

Marketing offers you a wealth of information that if applied correctly virtually can ensure your success. When you know how it works, you will significantly increase your odds of success! On the other hand, the total education offered at DEREE challenged me to see the world in a different way; to recognize the opportunities in obstacles, the unexplored potential in all situations and gave me the energy to knock the door! My creative spirit and leadership affinities have been unleashed, and I have been motivated to continue striving in all that I do.

What was your favorite course?

Operations Management with Professor Harry Athanassopoulos

Your favorite professor?

If I have to choose only one…then, Professor Gounaris is the one!

Your favorite activity at the College?

My favorite activity and the most refreshing break was the ballroom dancing with Mrs. Maria Nomikou.

Your favorite spot on campus?

The Fitness Center as I recall! I’m not sure though if this was the most preferred or most familiar spot on campus!

Did you make any close friends at DEREE?

Not many! Let’s say I have many friendly faces to remember but few that have an effective role in my life!

How did your come up with the idea for your business?

It was a time of great restlessness for me! I had just left my job as a senior sales manager for a big fashion distribution company and I felt it was time for me to “start putting my money where my mouth is”! So, I decided to take a leap of faith in a very uncertain business environment such as the one in Greece. FASHION CIRCUS was created in 2010 with a view to trade designer clothes at extremely low prices. The idea that gave a boost to the company’s creation, deals with the utilization of and endless supply of merchandise from a large number of retail stores and distribution companies, a fact that allows its sale at knockdown prices. During a period of economic depression, discounts can function beneficially in all directions, for both merchants and the public.

As you went about setting up Fashion Circus, did any lesson learned at DEREE stay in your mind?

Always be focused on your goals (this way you save time and money!). Be able to adapt and evolve in an ever-changing environment. Be unique in whatever you do!

Entrepreneurship is not valued in Greece as it is in other countries. Where did you find the drive to become an entrepreneur?

Denis Waitley said “A dream is your creative vision for your life in the future. You must break out of your current comfort zone and become comfortable with the unfamiliar and the unknown.” That is exactly what motivated me to become an entrepreneur.

Did you expect this crisis when you were starting?

The reason we thrive in our business venture is because of the crisis!

Would you have started the [business] had you known how severe the crisis would be?

Definitely! There is always room for a successful business even in the most hostile business environment.

Greece is notorious for its bureaucracy. How has that affected you and your business?

It has not only affected us psychologically for every single day since the beginning of our business but also financially due to corrupt public servants.

What special adjustments have you made so that your company can survive the crisis?

The company was founded during the crisis, so we had the advantages of knowing what lay ahead. The most important factor we had to ensure was our uniqueness! Our principal goal is to offer our customers a total shopping experience with high quality products at very low prices, under a highly amusing vibe that will drive them away from their problems (especially in this difficult time), at least for as long as they are in the world of “Fashion Circus”!

Tell us a few things that you would change in order to make life easier for entrepreneurs.

A) Bureaucracy

B) Bank Lending

C) Recent Legislation

D) Government Funding

None of these factors helps small businesses

Tell us a positive and a negative lesson you learned from running your companies.

If you respect people, people will always support you on whatever you do! On the other hand, bad copiers can cause damage to what you do!

Have fellow alumni supported your venture?

Yes, a lot!

Are you optimistic for the future?

Yes, I have big plans ahead!

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The Greek Crisis – Pt. 3

Part III

What’s to be done?

By Nicholas Pirounakis, Ph.D. *

To a very large extent what Greece needs to do to put her house back in order is implied in any serious and informed analysis of what caused the Greek crisis in the first place. In this – the third – part of the series we’ll attempt to provide a blueprint. We will not focus on the need for Greece to stay in the Eurozone (and the EU!), or effect a larger ‘haircut’ of her debt (including ‘official sector’ debt this time) than the recent PSI deal; we’ll focus instead on the reforms her creditors demand.

In this connection, crucial questions emerge. Does Greece want to reform herself? Can she? If so, how best can she go about it? After all, no amount of financial help from overseas will secure Greece’s future unless the country manages to become more productive, internationally competitive and efficient.

Without such a leap, even if the debt miraculously disappeared, in five years’ time Greece would again be heavily indebted – not least, because she would still have to deal with her rapidly deteriorating public services (health care, education, police protection, the judiciary), and other challenges, like waste, energy and water management, or the rapidly escalating inability of her social security system to pay pensions.

Sadly, although many of the reforms Greece’s creditors demand are long overdue, the troika’s program has singularly failed to incorporate them in a coherent whole. On their part, the Greek governments of 2009-2012, along with most of Greece’s political class, have also failed to work out such a program. The fact is that they never had a clue as to what makes a modern economy successful. In so failing the Greek side’s incompetence and irresponsibility in statesmanship became starkly clear. Its mentality was epitomised in ‘statism,’ the belief that (badly applied) Keynesian policies can be as effective in a globalized economy as they could, perhaps, have been in the protected economies of the past; that the state ‘creates’ economic development; that they must spend as if there is no tomorrow; that they must control the private sector to asphyxiation; and, of course, exchange votes for political favors as a matter of course.

One of the troika’s two main errors was that it appeared to attach much more importance to the need to consolidate Greek public finances than to the need to effect reforms in the real economy. A more even split would have been much more sensible. Its second main error was that it accepted too willingly the Greek side’s insistence on more and higher taxes rather than effecting cuts in government spending and reducing public sector size. This deepened the recession and, fatally, did so by strangling the side of the economy – the private sector – on which Greece’s hopes for development depend. Of course public sector cuts would have also deepened the recession; the difference is that Greece’s public sector is the main source of her problems, and its reduction would have in the medium- to long-term allowed Greece to ‘see light at the end of the tunnel’. There is an asymmetry here which Greece’s political class was unwilling to see or exploit: you tax more in order to preserve a bloated and inefficient public sector and the result is recession without hope; you reduce government spending and public sector size, the result is recession followed by recovery.

Greece’s private sector is not free of serious problems either. Its operation is burdened and distorted by the state’s inefficiency and corruption which naturally spread across the entire economy. It is also characterised by lack of competition, caused by ‘closed-shops’ and frequent instances of collusion and price-fixing among firms, particularly in the energy, transport and retail sectors. Also, some private firms have flourished on the basis of shady dealings they have had with the state rather than on merit. Important sectors have for too long been enticed to rely on government (or EEC/EU) subsidies and have consequently turned complacent and uncompetitive – e.g., farming. Sure enough, many occupations and firms have benefited from restrictive practices and do not welcome change. Such a private sector, however, cannot help Greece become internationally competitive and develop. Thus, although it’s mainly the private sector that has any chance of achieving this, it must first be appropriately reformed.

Necessary political reforms

In Greece any package of radical reforms needs to be introduced as a ‘big bang’ in order to succeed. For example, you cannot reform the judiciary, wait for 10 years to see that this particular reform works, then proceed to the next one. In Greece the ‘package’ would also need to start with the political sphere on account of the size and role of her public sector.

There’s been a lot of talk in Greece since the crisis began about how selfish, corrupt and incompetent most Greek politicians are. The truth is that in any democratic system which lacks appropriate checks and balances the political game tends to degenerate into an exchange of votes for favors; far more so and quickly, in fact, where democracy is unsubstantiated by a strong middle class. A politician who will not ‘play’ will not be re-elected, so all who stay in politics ‘play.’

Ancient Athenians were aware of this vulnerability of democracy. They knew that individuals are susceptible to corruption. Rather than rely on the off-chance that virtuous politicians might be elected, they introduced institutions that made systematic corruption extremely difficult – institutions that involved transparency, accountability, and placed limits on politicians’ power. In modern times political systems with a philosophy close to the Athenian ideal are the American and the British, to name but the best, perhaps, examples.

In Greece nine critical and long over-due political/institutional reforms are (1) a constitutional ban on the central government, prefectures and municipalities running systematic budget deficits, (2) repeal of the virtual immunity from prosecution that the current constitution affords ministers, (3) complete transparency on all public appointments and projects, (4) abolition of the permanent tenure regime for civil servants accompanied by the introduction of meritocratic procedures, (5) a constitutional ruling that MPs cannot be ministers, (6) a stop to funding political parties with public money but also transparency on private funding, (7) a constitutional provision that the rights to protest, march or strike cannot be exercised in ways that block essential services or the fundamental rights of others, (8) affording greater protection to private property which is presently often encroached upon due to, for example, excessive taxation, or expropriation without appropriate or prompt compensation, (9) allowing private universities to operate. Some of these things are not directly political, but since they all involve politically controversial changes in the current constitution they end up being so.

Excessive taxation and the middle class

There is one particular reform whose importance is so great that deserves a section unto itself. This is taxation, which bestrides politics, fiscal consolidation, and middle class ‘structuration.’

Taxes reduce efficiency. ‘Tax something, there will be less of it,’ the motto goes. Additionally, two desirable properties of taxation are that it must be ‘fair’ and take ‘ability to pay’ into account. Both fairness and ability to pay have been grossly neglected by the Greek state since 2010, whereas in the past it was probably fairness that suffered most as the tax system allowed tax evasion to flourish. (But then why shouldn’t people evade taxes if they can when, despite decades of profligate spending of borrowed money by governments, the level of state services is so abysmal?) Government tolerance of tax evasion continues to this day, but it has been ‘married’ to horrendous disregard for people’s ability to pay the many new taxes imposed. As for efficiency, a look at the construction industry is telling: crippling property taxation has helped bring the sector to its knees, and property prices continue to decline.

But there is another side to all this, which is more worrying from a long-term perspective. It is about what property taxes in particular do to Greece’s middle class. Most Greek households, taking advantage of a historically very wide distribution of land ownership and other favorable factors, managed over the post-war decades to build wealth portfolios made up predominantly of real estate. Even in advanced Western countries houses are the most valuable material possession most people ever get to have. Real estate wealth, in other words, and also the possibility that such wealth can serve to enhance the life chances of people’s children, is the basic element in the way a middle class comes into being (which, admittedly, also requires a certain measure of income, education, and culture). In turn a strong middle class is a sine qua non for a strong society. Historical experience, from ancient Athens and republican Rome to Victorian Britain and modern America, suggests as much.

The way the Greek middle class has been burdened of late with a new series of unrealistically high property taxes means that hundreds of thousands of Greek households who thought they had a secure wealth portfolio are now facing expropriation. According to Kapa-Research, a Greek consultancy, 18.1% of Greece’s property owners felt in January 2012 that they could not pay these real estate-related taxes, and 32.7% that they probably could not. Even if the state does not confiscate or auction away their properties, they’ll have to sell at hugely discounted prices because of taxes. The property market is already going downhill, and so will banks’ property portfolios. The result is a fast downsizing of Greece’s middle class, impoverishment, aversion to investing in real estate ever again in Greece, and widening inequality between haves and have-nots. Social cohesion will suffer; so will law and order, and Greeks’ faith in their country.

To avoid all that, it is imperative to abolish all wealth property taxation immediately, including inheritance taxes, and reduce other transfer taxes. This would allow the Greek middle class to preserve some hope for the future; would improve economic optimism dramatically; would raise real estate investment, something essential considering construction’s low-import content; and would be an incentive to improve state finances in the only sound way – i.e., through cuts. Other tax reductions are also necessary, like VAT, but property taxation reform is key.

Enhancing competitiveness

The next level of reforms concerns factors that enhance the ability of both the public sector and the private sector to operate efficiently, i.e., with the least cost or waste of resources; the ability of the public sector to offer good services to all, and direct welfare to those actually needing it; the ability of the private sector to operate, produce, and adjust quickly. It also concerns factors that enhance the quantity and quality of factors of production needed by both sectors.

It seems, therefore, that the following should top the relevant reform agenda for a Greek government with the desire or mandate to save the country:

(1) Decouple the operation of businesses from social policy aims; give companies complete freedom to hire & fire workers in response to economic exigencies, but also install a comprehensive system of unemployment benefits and retraining.

(2) Radically reform the social security and health-care system:

  • Only one social security organization (SSO).
  • Only one health-care-funding organization.
  • Pensionable age for most at 65-68 years; decrease of employers’ contributions; decrease of the spread between highest and lowest pensions; SSO pension in the nature of a minimum.
  • Parallel introduction of funded system, with role for private insurance.

(3) Complete the creation of Greece’s Land Registry, and fully computerize it, as this would allow investors to invest faster and without subsequent legal hassles, and strengthen economic agents’ property rights.

(4) Ovehaul the Tax Service’s computer systems and processes as the present situation leaves a lot to be desired, obtain the best relevant software, and, at last, start clamping down on tax evasion through cross-checking rather than through the horribly bureaucratic device of obliging people to collect hundreds of receipts. Use the system to speed up firms’ and people’s dealings with the Tax Service, and to minimize physical contact between it and the public.

(5) Simplify the tax code, and put it in place for a long, long time. The thrust of the law should be ‘almost exclusive emphasis on VAT, income, and capital-gains taxation – low tax rates – abolition of wealth and inheritance taxes’.

(6) Open up closed-shop professions in all walks of life (education included); speed up the process of permit-granting to new businesses; reduce amount of government-related paperwork involved in investing (including house-building) and the operation of enterprises. In this respect copy, if you must, what other countries are doing, from the UK to Turkey. As for opening up professions, some question how allowing, e.g., more taxis on the streets would help Greece’s recovery, when currently most taxis have difficulty finding customers. Well, rather than embarking on an economic treatise on the benefits of lower prices and such, let’s just say that the symbolic effect of abolishing closed-shops would be tremendous: the message would be that at last Greece is embracing competition.

(7) Cut the organic-cum-political link between higher education and the public sector. Ideally the state should allow true independence to universities of all kinds, oblige public-sector ones to charge fees, and offer support only to good students unable to pay. And to bring all universities and colleges (public, private, Greek, foreign) on an equal footing, give professional certification to graduates of disciplines involving the public interest (e.g., doctors, lawyers, engineers, accountants, teachers) only subject to successful performance in special post-degree exams. By publishing the results of such tests, the state (or other authority supervising the procedure) would also show urbi et orbi which universities and colleges are the best.

(8) Turning to schools, revolutionize teaching by stressing critical thinking rather than memorization. And create, or encourage the private sector to create, a layer of education between high school and university, whose role will be to produce technicians and low- to medium-level professionals, to fill a much necessary slot between unskilled workers and university graduates. High value-added economic development absolutely requires such personnel, as Germany’s experience proves.

(9) Simplify the legal system and speed up decisively and visibly the meting of justice. When disputes between private persons, or between such and the state, take sometimes decades to be resolved (e.g., in cases involving confiscation of land by the Archaeological Service), human and private property rights are encroached upon or in effect nullified. This is bad for investment and entrepreneurial activity.

Notice that wage reductions are not a part of the package. According to S. Gavroglu, of the National Labour & Manpower Institute, between 2010q1 & 2011q3 total labor costs in Greece fell by 14.3% (most of it in the private sector), although between 2000q1 & 2010q1 they had increased by 54.1% vs 28.7% for Portugal and 18.6% for Germany. Admittedly, high wages for no or little work in large parts of the public sector should be cut (in line with reductions in the sector’s size & bureaucracy level), but effecting such cuts across the board, and, worse, imposing them on the private sector is almost certainly counter-productive as it denies the struggling Greek economy much needed effective demand.

A counter-argument here is that much of that ‘effective demand’ used to go to imports since the country had become accustomed to producing very little and relying on loan-financed imports. Partly for this reason, IOBE, a Greek think tank, stressed in Jan. 2012 that in Greece’s case structural reforms (like the above) should precede wage reductions (or they won’t lead to product price reductions), and, in the context of structural reforms, product market reforms (like promoting competition) should precede labor market reforms. Absence of such a time-plan, N. Zonzelos of IOBE says, was one big hole in the troika’s program for Greece. In short, to make Greece more competitive, lower wages are, with few exceptions, less important than dismantling closed shops, abolishing restrictive practices and state bureaucracy, and cracking down on cartels.

Promising sectors

The third level of reforms concerns identifying the actual sectors that are most likely to spearhead Greece’s economic recovery. Of course, it won’t be the state which will ‘develop’ those sectors, although the state might certainly help. In a free entrepreneurial environment, unencumbered by bureaucracy or crippling taxation, private firms and individuals are certain to identify the most profitable sectors themselves.

(1) It seems that over the short-term, and until other sectors begin to yield fruit, construction should come first. As said, it has a low-import content, and is also labor-intensive. At the moment Greece needs jobs. The sector can moreover be easily revitalised if wealth property taxation is abolished – not so much because such tax-lifting would automatically eradicate the current recession, but because the positive psychological shock-effect would be tremendous.

(2) Very close to construction as an immediately available ‘cash-machine’ is tourism. Greece has over the years allowed herself to be drawn into a situation where she’s been selling her tourist ‘product’ increasingly cheaply, increasingly depending on tour operators, and increasingly marring her beautiful land-, sea- and urban-scapes in the process (largely because of the inefficiency and corruption of her public sector, and the greed of many). Her tourist ‘model’ therefore needs to change in the direction of attracting higher-income tourism on the basis of preserving and improving her ‘scapes’, her tourist infrastructure, and related services.

(3) Can construction and tourism combine? Well, the idea here is to go beyond the obvious, namely that in order to have more hotels you need to build them first. But Greece’s comparative advantage is her climate, her sea and beaches, her historic heritage. She can pursue, therefore, a policy of attracting well-off pensioners from W. Europe and other countries, or wealthy people in general, by offering them settlements (clusters of houses) in attractive places to live in. For this to work, appropriate medical facilities must also be near-by, so this scheme would not only create building and catering jobs, but medical and nursing ones too.

Further down the timeline are the following sectors:

(4) Energy. Again as a result of her comparative advantage, Greece can become a net exporter of clean energy, and probably a technological innovator in the field.

(5) Agriculture. Greece cannot compete with the US or Canada in, say, wheat or corn production. But it can compete very well if it embraces ‘boutique’ agriculture, i.e., cultivating high-quality products for the local market (which it can indeed supply amply if Greek farmers take up farming seriously again) and for discerning customers abroad. To this end, Greek farmers need urgent and high-quality marketing support.

(6) Food processing. At the moment Greece’s strongest manufacturing sector is food processing. This could be enhanced through appropriate marketing strategies for overseas expansion, but also through abolition of competition-diminishing distortions in the primary production – manufacturing – retailing nexus.

(7) Education. Liberalization of Greece’s higher education sector is very likely to attract a lot of students from abroad, again for reasons related to Greece’s comparative advantage as defined above. Even if most public and private universities and colleges fail to complement this advantage with high-quality education, some (private) ones will; competition will force many more to improve, with obvious benefits for the younger generations and for the country’s economy.

An interesting study by McKinsey & Co. (Greece 10 Years Ahead, Nov. 2011) added more ‘rising stars’ to the list of Greece’s promising sectors: manufacturing of generic pharmaceuticals – aquaculture – medical tourism – elderly care – regional cargo hub development – waste management.

It is certain that if the three levels of reforms mentioned above materialize, Greece will recover, and become independent and wealthy (and we haven’t considered the possibility of oil and gas reserves south of Crete, which is often heard of lately).

The fear is that Greece’s political class is not up to the task, and that a majority of the country’s people are too misguided and misinformed to embrace it.

* Dr Pirounakis is adjunct professor of Economics at DEREE-The American College of Greece. He has a BA from DEREE, an MSc from the University of Strathclyde and a Ph.D. from the University of Glasgow.

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The Greek Crisis – Pt. 2

Part II

The Chickens Come Home to Roost

By Dimitris Doulos, Ph.D.*

The October 2009 elections brought the socialist government back to power after five years of conservative governance. The fiscal condition of the Greek economy was the worst ever.

Two developments changed the attitude of foreign investors towards the Greek sovereign debt.

A. On November 26, 2009, Dubai World, the investment vehicle of the emirate, proposed a delay in the repayment of $26 billion of its debt by six months, raising the specter of the largest government default since the Argentinian debt restructuring. This caused significant turbulence in world financial markets. International investors started taking a closer look to those economies that were heavily in debt, including Greece.

B. The newly elected socialist government in Athens announced that the deficit and debt figures reported by the previous government were not accurate and needed to be revised upward.

These two developments resulted in more thorough scrutiny of Greek economic conditions and a quick reduction in the ratings of Greek bonds by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. As a result, the demand for Greek sovereign bonds plummeted, prices declined sharply and their yields increased to levels that made borrowing from the international markets prohibitive for the Greek government. Considering the large borrowing requirements of the Greek state and the imminent threat of default, in March 2010 the European Council decided to help Greece. However, markets were not persuaded and the spread (the difference between the yield of the Greek 10-year bond and the German equivalent) continued to climb. Greece was kept out of the markets, unable to finance its deficits and debt.

The fear that the Greek debt crisis could spread to other southern European countries led the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF (the so-called “troika”) to reach a deal with Greece. Athens was provided with 110 billion euros, the largest ever loan given to a country. In exchange it agreed to proceed with a number of measures listed in detail in the so-called “Memorandum I.” The agreement required that Greece proceed with fiscal consolidation (raising tax revenues and lowering government expenditures) and structural reforms in the public sector as well as in the products, services and labor markets. All these measures aimed at improving Greece’s finances and restoring its lost competitiveness in the world markets.

Unfortunately, very few – if any – of these measures were implemented and the credibility of Greece in the world financial markets was not restored, as this was reflected by the ever-rising spreads. Memorandum I failed for basically two reasons: First, and most important, it was never really implemented. The Greek government did not dare to go ahead with drastic structural reforms. And, second, several of the suggested actions were in the wrong direction (i.e. increased taxes in the midst of a recession). The deteriorating condition of the Greek economy led to a growing impression that the Greek debt was not sustainable.

In an effort to resolve the Greek sovereign debt problem, which in the meantime had spread to Portugal, Ireland, Spain and was threatening Italy and France, the Troika, on July 21st, 2011, decided to proceed with what was regarded as “unthinkable” up until that time: a voluntary 21% “haircut” of the Greek debt. That meant that for the first time the private sector was being asked to participate in the cost of the Greek bailout. This is Private Sector Involvement I (PSI-I), a good deal for the banks (creditors) since only the maturity of the bonds they held would increase and they would receive the face value of the bonds they held at a later date. Therefore, the “haircut” was only on the present value of the bonds. Obviously, the markets quickly sensed that the deal could not make the Greek debt sustainable since the “haircut” was too small. Spreads kept on rising.

A leaked report by the IMF confirmed the markets’ sense and on October 26, 2011 EU, ECB and IMF recommended PSI+. This new proposal called for a 50% “haircut” of Greek bonds worth 206 billion euros held by private investors. The deal, if successful, called for an exchange of these bonds for new ones. For every 100 euros, bond investors will receive 35 euros in new bonds with a lower coupon (below 4%) and longer maturity along with 15 euros in cash. The objective was to reduce the 206 billion euro portion of the Greek debt held by private investors (the total Greek public debt exceeds 350 billion euros) by approximately 60-70%, considering the decline in its present value, and reduce the total debt-to-GDP ratio to 120% by 2020. Once again, Greece was required to agree to proceed with fiscal consolidation and structural changes, as these will be listed in a new agreement – dubbed Memorandum II. In exchange Greece will receive 130 billion euros financing which will hopefully be enough to cover its needs until it is able to borrow from the international markets again. A significant amount of this loan will be used for the recapitalization of the Greek banking sector.

How will the Greek debt crisis end?

The Greek debt crisis will end when market trust on the Greek economy returns and Greece will be able to borrow again from the international markets. The success of PSI+, even though it will only offer a temporary relief, is essential for the survival of the Greek economy. The agreement should be followed by a plan, based on Memorandum II, to restore fiscal balance and proceed with structural changes that should have been implemented years – decades! – ago.

With PSI+ successful following its approval by both the creditors and the Greek parliament, the Troika is free to provide Greece with the agreed upon loans, so that the country can meet its immediate obligations. Greek bonds worth of 14.4 billion euros expired in March and Greece was able to meet its payments and avoid a disorderly default and the consequent exit from the Eurozone. For the time being, Greece remains a member of the common European currency club.

What does a return to a national currency mean?

A return to a national currency, which is advocated by some, would result in an automatic conversion from euros to the new currency – say, the ‘new drachma.’ All payments and reciepts domestically, deposits, salaries etc., would be denominated in drachmas. The external debt, government and private, however, would remain denominated in euros. The drachma would devalue by 50-60%, which means that the value of the external debt would almost double. Imports would become very expensive and essential imported goods like fuel and heating oil would become scarce since they would have to be paid for in hard currency, and in cash. Any gains in the competitiveness of Greek exports would be partially offset by domestic inflation, which would probably surge to 50-80%. The Greek banking system would suffer large losses and probably collapse since it would lose its access to liquidity in the interbank market, as no foreign bank will be willing to lend with Greek bonds as collateral. This would inevitably lead to the nationalization of those banks that will manage to survive. In a nutshell, exit from the Eurozone would be a huge shock for the Greek economy and society.

Which raises the question: proceed with the proposed measures of Memorandum II or exit the eurozone?

For now, the country has decided to go with the former.

* Dr. Doulos is professor of Economics at DEREE-The American College of Greece. He holds a BS from DEREE, an MA and MBA from Western Michigan University and an MA and Ph.D. from Wayne State University.

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The Greek Crisis – Pt. 1

Part I

A Slow Descent to Economic Hell

By Odysseus Katsaitis, Ph.D.*

Contrary to popular economic folklore, the collapse of the Greek economy did not come as a surprise: the crisis was an accident waiting to happen. What should come as a surprise was that the party lasted for so long.

This crisis is not about economics. It is about a society, or, at least a significant part of a society, including most of its politicians, that decided to live its myth. Like the song, Greece “put on the pink glasses and life was like the movies.” Except that with this movie the ticket had to be paid at the end. Unfortunately, it turned out that the ticket was so expensive that this society and the next generation and, most probably, the generation after the next will have to keep paying for the ticket.

Starting our analysis from the sixties, the period 1960 -1973 can be described as the “golden era” of Greek development. Consumption, as a share of GDP, was actually dropping (!) during the period, while savings and investment were rising. As Figure 1 indicates, consumption dropped to about 55% of GDP while investment rose to, approximately, 40%. Thus, it was not surprising that GDP grew at an impressive 7.1% per year. The contribution of each component of GDP is presented in Table 1 and it is obvious that consumption and investment were equally important. The negative contribution of net exports (exports minus imports) was not especially worrisome because most imports were machinery and equipment for industry.

The period 1974 -1994 can be described as the period of “missed opportunities.” By the late seventies / early eighties things change radically. Society, unilaterally, declares itself wealthy, consumption as a share of GDP increases, savings and investment decline dramatically. It is hardly surprising, that the economy grows at a pathetic 1.4% per year. Moreover, this growth comes from consumption while investment has a negative impact.

From today’s perspective poor economic growth was the least of Greece’s problems of that period. The actual problem was that society entered into a self-destructive path that ended with the 2009 crisis. By 1980, politicians began discovering the joys of government deficits. Rather than fighting tax evasion or trying to attract new investments and, therefore, increase tax revenue, they just borrow money. Public debt, which was only 20% of GDP in 1980, doubles to 40% in just five years (see Figure 2). Consequently, demand in the economy increases, putting pressure on prices. At the same time, Greece receives substantial amounts of EU money[1] which was supposed to be spent on projects improving the competitiveness of the Greek economy, but, unfortunately, was spent on consumption[2]. Thus, besides government deficits, demand was also increasing because of EU subsidies. Bottom line, inflation went out of control (see figure 3). As prices were rising, wages had to follow. But, as the cost of production was rising, exports declined and imports increased (see figure 4). Given the foreign exchange constraint that the country was facing in those days, the easy solution was devaluation of the national currency, the drachma. Devaluations, eventually, increase the level of prices (because the cost of imported goods increases). So Greece entered a vicious cycle of devaluations: price increases, wage increases and, consequently, more devaluations. Just note that in the mid-seventies the exchange rate was 30 drachmas to the dollar and by the mid-nineties it was 300 drachmas to the dollar.

These problems could have been addressed by increasing the productive capacity of the economy, i.e. by attracting investments, especially, foreign investments. In principle, Greece, like Portugal or Spain, should have been able to attract foreign investment. However, Greece attracted a minute fraction of the funds invested in those countries. The reasons are well known: an institutional framework unfavorable, to put it mildly, to business, a corrupt bureaucracy, an unpredictable tax system, an ill-defined framework for obtaining the necessary operating licenses for a business, highly regulated markets, archaic labor legislation, a dysfunctional judicial system.

The last period, 1995 – 2008, can be described as the “party time” period. Investment increases a little bit, but growth (3.4% per year) is driven primarily by consumption (see Figure 1 and Table 1). The government is forced to reduce the budget deficit (net lending of the government) in order to satisfy the Maastricht criteria (budget deficit less than 3% of GDP). So, the deficit drops from 9% to almost 3% (possibly with a little bit of help from “creative accounting”). As soon as we enter the Eurozone the deficit increases and by 2004 reaches an impressive 7% (see Figure 5).

During the 2001 – 2008 period consumer and housing loans increase at a rate of 30% per year. By 2008 private consumption reaches an astonishing 73% of GDP compared to less than 60% for the rest of EU. Imports increase accordingly (see Figure 4). In 2008 net lending of the economy equals 16% of GDP. To put it differently, we were spending 16% more of what we were producing while the sum of public and household debt was over 220% of GDP. It was just a matter of time for our lenders to realize that Greek bonds might be a risky investment.

* Dr. Katsaitis is Professor of Economics and head of the Economics department at DEREE. He is a graduate of the University of Athens and holds a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia.

Figure 1

Evolution of Greek GDP: 1960 – 2008

 

 

Source: AMECO

 

Table 1

Contribution of components of GDP to growth

Source: AMECO

 

Figure 2

Public Debt

 

Source: AMECO

 

Figure 3

Inflation rate: 1960 – 2008

 

Source: AMECO

 

 

Figure 4

Exports – Imports of Greece: 1960 – 2008

 

Source: AMECO

 

 

Figure 5

Net lending of the economy and of the government

 

Source: AMECO


[1] It should be noted that during the last thirty years Greece has received more than 400 billion euros from the EU.

[2] To the extent that these EU funds were spend on not growth promoting projects, they had a negative impact upon the growth of the economy by attracting resources which, otherwise, would have been employed in growth enhancing activities. According to The Economist (March 29, 2003), quoting “a senior Greek official in Brussels”: “The best thing the EU could do for Greece is to cut off the structural funds immediately (…); anybody who works hard at a regular business is regarded as an idiot, since it is much easier to set up a project to draw in European subsidies.”

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The Greek Crisis – Private Higher Education

Private Higher Education:
An opportunity for Greece

By Nickolaos Travlos, Ph.D.*

The severe economic crisis that Greece is currently going through offers a unique chance to explore hidden opportunities for economic growth in the areas that Greece has a competitive advantage. While tourism and shipping are usually considered as areas with great potential, less emphasis is given to the area of higher education. However, as I will argue below, higher education is an area where Greece can play a key role in the international arena with significant economic impact in various sections of the economy.

Historical reasons: Greece is recognized internationally as the cradle of western civilization. The significant contribution of Greek thinkers to almost all sciences makes Greece a natural place to establish a modern cluster of academic institutions. These can attract a large number of foreign students, especially in the area of Liberal Arts and Sciences.

Natural Beauty and Climate: The climate along with the natural beauty of the country can potentially turn Greece into a dynamic international academic center, attracting students from Europe, the Balkans, Asia, Africa, and even the Americas and Australia.

Human Resources: It is widely known that Greeks place a high value on education. There is a large number of distinguished Greek professors living in Greece and abroad who could staff several colleges and universities similar in quality to some of the famous international institutions. There is also a plethora of Greek young professionals with graduate degrees who possess international experience. They could offer high quality administrative services required by such institutions of higher education.

Despite the aforementioned strategic benefits Greece is endowed with, it is disheartening that the country has not taken advantage of them. The reason for this is simple: the refusal of the political system to accept the establishment and operation of private universities in the country. The problem goes as far back as the mid 1970’s when the conservative government of Constantine Karamanlis included a clause in the new constitution (Article 16), which does not allow private universities in Greece. Although there have two attempts to amend this particular article and the two major political parties had agreed on this issue, eventually the socialist PASOK party refused to support the amendment in 2007. The establishment of Postsecondary Education Centers (KE.ME) under the Laws 3696/2008 and 3848/2010 constitutes only an ambiguous and halfway attempt to acknowledge the existence of private institutions of higher education. The result is that Greece is one of the few countries in the world which do not recognize private higher education. It is interesting to note that Turkey has long introduced private colleges and universities. As a matter of fact, at least two of them (Koc University and Sabanci University) are competing successfully with well-established European and North American institutions. In Europe, Spain has established several private universities which are ranked very highly in the various international ranking lists. For example, in 2012 two Spanish Business Schools are included in the top 100 Business Schools of the Financial Times. It is also interesting to note that in their MBA programs 70% of their students come from abroad. Even Cyprus has introduced private universities, allowing the country to attract several thousands of foreign students.

This refusal to introduce private universities in Greece, even not-for-profit ones, consequently has left the role of attracting foreign students to the state universities. Given that their infrastructure and funding from the government are not adequate, state universities cannot fulfill this need. While struggling to accommodate the Greek students, it is impossible, to pay attention to the international market.

A window of opportunity arises for our country. The introduction of private colleges and universities, at least in the form of not-for-profit institutions, is a must. The social, economic, political and international conditions have changed relative to the ones in the 1970’s. The country can no longer afford to forgo its competitive advantages. The economy needs a stimulus; society needs diversity; people demand additional choices; democracy requires the freedom to choose; Greece must put the brakes on its brain drain and provide a vehicle to bring back the renowned Greek academics of the diaspora. Recognizing private colleges and universities is a necessity.

The state universities will benefit from liberalization as well, because some of their students will transfer to the private ones, resulting in better services for the remaining students. In addition, the competition will force state universities to explore the opportunities the new legal framework offers in attracting private funds and establishing collaborations with foreign universities. The Greek economy will benefit because the private universities will invest in facilities and infrastructure that will attract thousands of foreign students and support a cluster of industries around them, revitalizing Athens, Thessaloniki, Patra, and several islands. High caliber faculty of state universities will benefit as well from these developments because the Greek academic community will be enriched and enlarged. The only group which stands to lose is those academics who use the university merely as a source of prestige and networking with old-style politicians.

It is time Greece stops accommodating the vested interests of a minority of Greek academics and politicians; it is the last opportunity to serve the interest of Greek society at large. Recognizing private colleges and universities should be a top national priority.

* Dr. Travlos is holder of The Kitty Kyriacopoulos Chair in Finance and dean of the ALBA Graduate Business School at the American College of Greece.

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The Greek Crisis – Crime and the Financial Crisis: Greece and beyond

Crime and the Financial Crisis: Greece and beyond

By Leonidas K. Cheliotis, Ph.D.*

It is commonly assumed that the ‘credit crunch’ of 2008 has fuelled a significant rise in crime on either side of the Atlantic. Indeed, it is also commonly assumed that this rise builds on a supposed inexorable growth in crime rates over the last three decades or so.

Yet study after study reveals that the prevalence of crime has long been falling both in the United States and Britain, whilst the ‘credit crunch’ of 2008 has scarcely functioned to reverse this trend. What has actually increased in these jurisdictions over recent decades is public fear of criminal victimization and support for the harsh punishment of offenders. Indeed, there is an accumulating throng of surveys demonstrating that levels of fear of crime and punitiveness amongst Americans and Britons bear little if any connection to the prevalence of crime, and that they rather reflect spreading economic insecurity and associated frustrations.

In Greece, few have questioned the relationship between crime rates and fear of criminal victimization. Yet, as Sappho Xenakis, of Oxford University, and I have shown in our recent book Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Greece: International Comparative Perspectives, police-recorded crime rates in the country rose only modestly between 1980 and 2006, and most of this rise was due to offences of little criminological interest (for example, traffic offences such as speeding and illegal parking). By contrast, fear of crime, as well as punitiveness, have been disproportionately high amongst Greek citizens. Strikingly, ever since its inclusion in pertinent international comparative analyses in the early 2000s, Greece has ranked amongst the most crime-fearing and punitive nations in Europe and beyond. We argue that, here too, the evidence points to the role of socio-economic insecurities in triggering and inflaming fear of crime and punitive attitudes.

Of course, the biggest question today domestically is the extent to which crime rates in Greece have risen in the wake of the recent and ongoing financial crisis. This, unfortunately, is hard to determine in the absence of reliable up-to-date data. The Anglo-American experience would suggest, however, that there is no axiomatic relationship between a financial downturn and the rate of crime. Expectations of a rise in public fear of crime and punitiveness, on the other hand, sadly have a far more solid empirical grounding.

Even if data are to confirm that there has been as spike in crime rates in Greece since the onset of the financial crisis, it would be wrong to succumb to the temptation of using such data to retrospectively justify what have been longstanding trends of disproportionately high levels of fear of crime and punitiveness in the country.

* Leonidas K. Cheliotis graduated from DEREE with a BA in Sociology in 2003 and earned his M.Phil. and Ph.D. at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge. He is currently Lecturer in Criminology and Deputy Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice at the School of Law, Queen Mary, University of London.

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